Heresthetics
William Riker was one of the leading scholars "positive political theory," or the Rational Choice School of political science. He developed a theory of political action based on a skill he called heresthetics: structuring the world so you can win.
Positive political theory has three central assumptions: 1)
Rationality-individuals make reasoned decisions; 2) Component analysis-only
small parts of a system are important in predicting human behavior; and 3)
Strategic behavior-individuals take into account what others may do before
making decisions (interaction as opposed to action). All three assumptions play
an important role in his model and attempt to answer the question: Does a
distinctly political kind of behavior exist? Riker's answer is yes:
heresthetics. Riker coined this term from a Greek root meaning "choosing and
electing." For Riker, the rational political person wants to win at the game of
politics. How they win is using rhetoric (verbal skill in persuasion) and
heresthetics (structuring the process so one may win) to build effective
coalitions.
Riker begins his foundation with David Easton's model of allocations. Easton
claims politics is the authoritative allocation of value. Demands, resources,
and support enter the decision-making process and the outputs become the
allocation of values, the allocation of costs, the mobilization of resources,
and the maintenance of the system. Within the decision-making process, Riker
says decisions on such allocation may be classified as:
A. Those made by individuals
B. Those made by groups
1. Those made by conscious process
2. Those made in a quasi-mechanical
way
B.1. represents the acts of coalitions, which make up most decision making in
political settings (even in authoritarian regimes). Within groups, smaller
groups make the actual decisions. These smaller groups are called coalitions.
So Riker focuses his study of the decision-making process on coalitions. Riker
found a model for decision making in coalitions in the Von Neumann-Morgenstern
theory of n-person games, in which agents attempt to "win" by creating groups,
i.e. coalitions. Game theory also involves the idea of zero-sum games, in which
only two agents compete and one must lose. N-person games allow for a
distribution of value--a group can win without necessarily taking value away
from the opposing group(s).
Riker's political model works on two assumptions:
1- The zero-sum condition. While hardly useful by itself, the concept of
zero-sum plays an important part in Riker's thinking. By abstracting only
conflict, it is possible to concentrate on the problem of winning. And it is in
the idea of winning that the importance of rhetoric and heresthetics emerges.
2- The condition of rationality. Von Neumann-Morgenstern define rational
action economically. People act to gain money or an equivalent commodity to
meet their desired satisfaction or utility. To do this is to act rationally.
But the problem is, as Riker says, we "all know of instances in which persons
behave as if they prefer less money to more" (Coalition 17). To eliminate this
objection, especially for using this definition in social and political
contexts, Riker suggests that it be stated this way: Given two courses of
action leading to different outcomes, people will choose the course that leads
to the preferred outcome (18-19). But this restatement is a problem because it
is creates a tautology--all human action becomes rational by definition. Riker
says: "It must not be asserted that all behavior is rational but rather merely
that some behavior is and that this possibly small amount is crucial for the
construction and operation of economic and political institutions" (20).
Institutions, like people, when behaving rationally "behave in a maximizing
way," Riker says. This follows the Von Neumann-Morgenstern definition. Riker
claims that, politically, people and institutions want to maximize power. But
he prefers the "notion" of "winning" instead of "power" because it is a more
specific statement of what a political person wants (Coalition 21-22).
So, Riker restates the definition of rational behavior this way: "Given social
situations within certain kinds of decision-making institutions…and in which
exist two alternative courses of action with differing outcomes…, some
participants will choose the alternative leading to the larger payoff" (23).
The larger payoff, like a jackpot, is a coalition's winnings. The question now
becomes: How do people win? And Riker's answer is: People win politically
through the skilled use of the arts of rhetoric and heresthetics. Of
heresthetics, Riker says it is true that people win politically because they
have induced other people to join them in alliances and coalitions. But the
winners induce by more than rhetorical attraction. Typically they win because
they have set up the situation in such a way that other people will want to
join them--or feel forced by circumstances to join them--even without any
persuasion at all. And this is what heresthetics is about: structuring the
world so you can win.
Riker's The Art of Political Manipulation shows how politicians have
used heresthetics to win using a series of political stories told in chapters,
each with a specific how-to lesson. There are generally three categories of
heresthetical strategies:
1- Agenda control: manipulating the agenda for favorable voting
outcomes.
2- Strategic voting: using voting procedures to control outcomes.
3- Manipulation of dimensions: redefining the situation to create a
stronger coalition.
Rhetoric, the art of verbal/written persuasion (as defined by Riker), plays a
crucial role in setting up an heresthetical maneuver. The difference between
the two, as Riker sees it, is that heresthetics, as opposed to rhetoric, is a
direct manipulation of the political structure to win a specific outcome. (As a
social-epistemic rhetorician, I do not think that direct manipulation of a
process can ever be divorced from a speech act. Riker's theory of rhetoric
appears to accept the medieval split between rhetoric and logic, which leads to
a theory that cannot accept language use as the prime mediator between mankind
and reality or as the prime creator of human experience. No matter. I contend
that Riker's heresthetics has made an important contribution to the study of
rhetoric and the discipline of political science.)
The irony of Riker's model is that his search for a science of politics led him
to the art of rhetoric and the art heresthetics, which is "not a science. There
is no set of scientific laws that can be more or less mechanically applied to
generate successful strategies" (Manipulation ix). Riker thought the same way
about rhetoric, saying that "our knowledge of rhetoric and persuasion is itself
minuscule" (Strategy 4). Instead, we can apply only examples we are given from
history. In The Strategy of Rhetoric, Riker begins his search for a
science of rhetoric and heresthetics. He died before he could complete the
task. The book was published posthumously.
Riker, William. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale UP, 1962.
____. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." APSR. 74 (1980): 432-46.
____. Liberalism Against Populism. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982.
____. "The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice." APSR. 78 (1984): 1-16.
____. The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale UP, 1986.
____. The Strategy of Rhetoric. New Haven: Yale UP, 1996.