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	<title>Comments on: Information and authority&#8230;</title>
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		<title>By: acline</title>
		<link>http://rhetorica.net/archives/2419.html/comment-page-1#comment-2351</link>
		<dc:creator>acline</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Jun 2004 08:46:31 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Charles...your thoughts about truth fit the embodied model fairly well. It doesn&#039;t deny the correspondence model outright. Rather, it clams that theory is missing the other, subjective half. 
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Charles&#8230;your thoughts about truth fit the embodied model fairly well. It doesn&#8217;t deny the correspondence model outright. Rather, it clams that theory is missing the other, subjective half. </p>
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		<title>By: Charles Knell</title>
		<link>http://rhetorica.net/archives/2419.html/comment-page-1#comment-2350</link>
		<dc:creator>Charles Knell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Jun 2004 07:03:21 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I&#039;m not an academic, just a reasonably well-read citizen. The difference between these two understandings of what &quot;truth&quot; is seems to correspond to an argument I have been having with a friend for some time. His idea of truth is pretty much of the &quot;correspondence&quot; school. While not denying that, I make a distinction between &quot;facts&quot; and &quot;truth&quot; where he will not acknowledge the difference.

There are non-controversial propositions. Take the case of two friends who are planning to go to a movie theater. One asks the other, &quot;What time does the movie start?&quot; The other replies, &quot;8:45.&quot; The first says, &quot;I think it starts at 8:30.&quot; How do they discover the truth? They could call the theater and ask. The disagreement would end there. The fact of the movie&#039;s starting time is settled. More importantly it isn&#039;t very important to anyone&#039;s worldview. It is a simple fact.

There are other propositions that are not generally agreed. Let&#039;s take one that is popular with citizens who opposed the invasion of Iraq, &quot;Invading Iraq is all about oil.&quot; To those people who hold this view, it is a &quot;True&quot; statement. To those who don&#039;t agree, it is nonsense.

This statement is not easily verified by some means that parties on opposite sides of the question can readily agree. The &quot;Truth&quot; of the propsition is manifest and undeniable to those holding the view. Its falseness is equally manifest and undeniable to those who disagree.

Do the parties live in a different world? No, they don&#039;t. But they plainly understand their common world in different ways. The truth or falseness of such propositions is very important to those involved in this argument unlike the question of &quot;What time does the movie start?&quot;

My view is that the more important the truth of a proposition is to someone, the less important facts are in informing his opinion. People will dismiss facts contradictory to their view as &quot;unimportant&quot; or even as lies. They will invest great importance in facts that a disinterested party would not invest much weight in. They will make statements about facts in support of their view that are demonstrably false and will deny any refutation no matter how persuasive it may be to a disinterested party.

What I&#039;m saying is that &quot;Truth&quot; is created by persons combining facts, prejudices, fears, hopes, faith, and lies. That kind of &quot;Truth&quot; is core to a person&#039;s image of himself, the world, and how he fits into it. The more important such a &quot;Truth&quot; is, the less amenable it is to persuasion. You can&#039;t expect to offer some contradictory facts to someone and have him change a cherished belief about &quot;Truth&quot;. That someone&#039;s idea of what is &quot;True&quot; doesn&#039;t correspond to what my idea of what is &quot;True&quot; doesn&#039;t trouble me. I expect that to be the case in important questions. I do not need to pry into what&#039;s going on inside another person&#039;s head. Basically all I&#039;m concerned with is how whatever is going on inside someone&#039;s head controls his or her behavior.

All this being said, people are persuadable. Sometimes people are persuaded bit-by-bit, indirectly, and over a long period. Sometimes a person is just riding on a donkey to Damascus.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;m not an academic, just a reasonably well-read citizen. The difference between these two understandings of what &#8220;truth&#8221; is seems to correspond to an argument I have been having with a friend for some time. His idea of truth is pretty much of the &#8220;correspondence&#8221; school. While not denying that, I make a distinction between &#8220;facts&#8221; and &#8220;truth&#8221; where he will not acknowledge the difference.</p>
<p>There are non-controversial propositions. Take the case of two friends who are planning to go to a movie theater. One asks the other, &#8220;What time does the movie start?&#8221; The other replies, &#8220;8:45.&#8221; The first says, &#8220;I think it starts at 8:30.&#8221; How do they discover the truth? They could call the theater and ask. The disagreement would end there. The fact of the movie&#8217;s starting time is settled. More importantly it isn&#8217;t very important to anyone&#8217;s worldview. It is a simple fact.</p>
<p>There are other propositions that are not generally agreed. Let&#8217;s take one that is popular with citizens who opposed the invasion of Iraq, &#8220;Invading Iraq is all about oil.&#8221; To those people who hold this view, it is a &#8220;True&#8221; statement. To those who don&#8217;t agree, it is nonsense.</p>
<p>This statement is not easily verified by some means that parties on opposite sides of the question can readily agree. The &#8220;Truth&#8221; of the propsition is manifest and undeniable to those holding the view. Its falseness is equally manifest and undeniable to those who disagree.</p>
<p>Do the parties live in a different world? No, they don&#8217;t. But they plainly understand their common world in different ways. The truth or falseness of such propositions is very important to those involved in this argument unlike the question of &#8220;What time does the movie start?&#8221;</p>
<p>My view is that the more important the truth of a proposition is to someone, the less important facts are in informing his opinion. People will dismiss facts contradictory to their view as &#8220;unimportant&#8221; or even as lies. They will invest great importance in facts that a disinterested party would not invest much weight in. They will make statements about facts in support of their view that are demonstrably false and will deny any refutation no matter how persuasive it may be to a disinterested party.</p>
<p>What I&#8217;m saying is that &#8220;Truth&#8221; is created by persons combining facts, prejudices, fears, hopes, faith, and lies. That kind of &#8220;Truth&#8221; is core to a person&#8217;s image of himself, the world, and how he fits into it. The more important such a &#8220;Truth&#8221; is, the less amenable it is to persuasion. You can&#8217;t expect to offer some contradictory facts to someone and have him change a cherished belief about &#8220;Truth&#8221;. That someone&#8217;s idea of what is &#8220;True&#8221; doesn&#8217;t correspond to what my idea of what is &#8220;True&#8221; doesn&#8217;t trouble me. I expect that to be the case in important questions. I do not need to pry into what&#8217;s going on inside another person&#8217;s head. Basically all I&#8217;m concerned with is how whatever is going on inside someone&#8217;s head controls his or her behavior.</p>
<p>All this being said, people are persuadable. Sometimes people are persuaded bit-by-bit, indirectly, and over a long period. Sometimes a person is just riding on a donkey to Damascus.</p>
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		<title>By: acline</title>
		<link>http://rhetorica.net/archives/2419.html/comment-page-1#comment-2349</link>
		<dc:creator>acline</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Jun 2004 04:15:46 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Charles...thanks for calling me on this one. I knew I was being lazy when I linked to the book. I&#039;ve defined it in other posts. But it&#039;s unreasonable to suppose that readers should have to go hunting for it.

In short, the embodied theory of truth is different from correspondence theory in that it accepts truth as contingent upon human understanding. It is not, however, a subjective theory. It is a transactionalist theory in that it does not deny the reality of physical phenomena. The theory asserts that truth is found in our interaction with phenomena.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Charles&#8230;thanks for calling me on this one. I knew I was being lazy when I linked to the book. I&#8217;ve defined it in other posts. But it&#8217;s unreasonable to suppose that readers should have to go hunting for it.</p>
<p>In short, the embodied theory of truth is different from correspondence theory in that it accepts truth as contingent upon human understanding. It is not, however, a subjective theory. It is a transactionalist theory in that it does not deny the reality of physical phenomena. The theory asserts that truth is found in our interaction with phenomena.</p>
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		<title>By: Charles Knell</title>
		<link>http://rhetorica.net/archives/2419.html/comment-page-1#comment-2348</link>
		<dc:creator>Charles Knell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Jun 2004 02:31:17 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>It would have been nice if the link to &quot;embodied theory of truth&quot; had gone to something as useful as the link to &quot;correspondence theory of truth&quot;. I recognize that Rhetorica is an unpaid labor of love for you and that it is not incumbent upon you to do everything I would like you to do, but I still don&#039;t have a clear idea of exactly what it (&quot;embodied theory of truth&quot;) means and the readers&#039; reviews on Amazon haven&#039;t set my heart racing at the thought of reading the book.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It would have been nice if the link to &#8220;embodied theory of truth&#8221; had gone to something as useful as the link to &#8220;correspondence theory of truth&#8221;. I recognize that Rhetorica is an unpaid labor of love for you and that it is not incumbent upon you to do everything I would like you to do, but I still don&#8217;t have a clear idea of exactly what it (&#8220;embodied theory of truth&#8221;) means and the readers&#8217; reviews on Amazon haven&#8217;t set my heart racing at the thought of reading the book.</p>
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